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In this paper, we pursue further the consequences of litigant selection on the structure of judicial hierarchies. In a prior paper (Cameron and Kornhauser [2005] ), we constructed a simple model in which, under reasonable circumstances, the optimal judicial hierarchy had three tiers: a trial court, an intermediate appellate court and a supreme court. In that model, litigant selection of appeals creates a striking set of incentives. First, if a party knows it has lost improperly, it has a strong incentive to appeal, at least if the higher court is at all likely to correct the lower court's error. But the incentive to appeal an improper judgment is true at any level in the judicial hierarchy below the highest level. Therefore, a correctly winning litigant has a strong incentive to contest "improper" appeals by a correctly losing litigant, if the correct loser improperly prevails on appeal. Knowing this, a correctly losing litigant has little incentive to appeal in the first place. From this perspective, the AngloAmerican system of appeals implicitly pits the two litigants against one another, encouraging them to police one another's improper appeals. As a consequence, the appellate process quickly sorts the litigants properly.
In this essay we examine the importance of litigant knowledge on the efficacy of litigation selection and the choice of decisional rules at the trial and appellate levels. The change in the information st dicial strategies. In the equilibri judges always decide in accordanc lution of the case. Their beliefs r have received and on the actions This aspect of the model is unrea on the litigants' decisions to appe mation concerning the correct r tentially uninformed, decisions a no longer correspond to the jud These judges no longer rest their cisions to appeal. This result is str it more closely conforms to the ferior courts than acting on beli appeal.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model and summarizes our prior results. Section 3 investigates behavior within a two-tiered hierarchy. Section 4 considers behavior in a three-tiered court system. Section 5 discusses our results. In particular, it considers the implications of our model when the quality of adjudication at each tier is endogenous; and it suggests how our results may be extended to the case of potentially two-sided asymmetric information of the litigants. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The literature investigating litigant selection and the structure o systems is quite sparse. Shavell [1995] identifies a set of fees and insure that appeals are made only in wrongly decided cases. In h Schwarz [1995] As in Cameron and Kornhauser [2005] , we model the judicial system as a team, a set of individuals who share objectives but may have different information.
Preliminaries
There are two classes of litigants -plaintiffs and defendants -and, depending on the game, one, two, or three tiers of judges. Defendants have a type β e {/, nl], (liable and not liable, respectively). Nature selects defendant's type as / with common knowledge probability p0. Plaintiff and defendant each have two actions open to them in the event the judicial system has more than one tier. Suppose the system has Τ tiers. If a judgment at tier t < Τ is adverse to its interest, losing litigant j at level t may either appeal (s'j = 1) or not appeal (sj. = 0). (A judgment at tier Τ cannot be appealed.) Let σ· denote the probability of an appeal by losing litigant j at tier t.
A judge / at tier t reaches judgment v' e {/, nl} (defendant held liable or not liable, respectively). Let p' denote the probability that judge i at tier t reaches judgment v' = /. Finally, let vF denote the final judgment prevailing in the judicial system; i.e., vF is the decision of the judge at the highest tier in the system to hear the case.
In this team model, all judges wish to maximize the expected number of rightly decided cases in the system. The utility of judge / at level t is then given by Í1 if vF = ß, M< JO if υΡφβ.
Defendant pays damages d in the event that vF = I (that is, she is held liable in the end); otherwise she pays 0. In addition, a litigant incurs a cost c each time she appeals.
1 Cameron, Segal, and Songer [2000] consider strategic auditing, as do Spitzer and Talley [2000] . Cameron [1993] sketches a model of judicial tournaments (see also KORNHAUSER [1995] ). Judicial tournaments are then explored in more detail in McNollgast et al. [1995] . Shavell [1995, footnote 2] provides citations to the literatures on appeals by employers and in administrative agencies. Information evolves during the course of play probabilistically. Reference to Figure 1 may prove helpful in understanding this evolution. Initially, defendant's type β is private information; hence, it may be rational for defendant and plaintiff to engage in litigation (however, we do not actually model the pre-trial settlement process). Trial results in two signals. The trial judge receives a public signal je1 g {0, β] where the signal 0 is uninformative and the signal β is fully informative.
The signal β is received with probability π·1 . More generally, the court at tier t receives a signal x* e {0, β}; the signal β is received with probability π'. In addition, at trial, the plaintiff receives, independently, a private signal y e {0, β}; the signal β is received with probability Θ. After trial, then, information about defendant's type may be in one of state one, which occurs with probability (1 -0)(1 -π/) knowledg type is exclusive to defendant. In this case, the judge has received a public signal of defendant's type and the plaintiff has received a private signal. In state two which occurs with probability 0(1 -of defendant's type is shared by defendant and plaintiff alone. I Judge has received an uninformative public signal but plaintiff has formative private signal. In state three which occurs with probabilit of defendant's type is public information, following the receipt o public signal.3 Of course, if appeals occur, then state 1 or state into state 3.
We assume information begins in state one, so it is rational fo plaintiff to engage in litigation (we do not model pre-or post-trial s with probability π} , a public, fully informative signal emerges d specifically, as a result of the trial and the judge's deliberation conce fact and law, the judge at tier t receives a public signal xl in {0, β}, a non-informative signal.4 Independently, a fully informative pr emerge with probability θ again in the set {0, β}. If a public, fully in emerges, information moves to state three. If the public signal is u a private, informative signal does emerge, information moves to sta signal is informative, information remains in state one.
We assume that if the plaintiff receives an informative private signa know it. That is, it is common knowledge between them that def been revealed to plaintiff and information is in state two.
We also assume that the judge cannot distinguish between state and this is common knowledge. That is, the judge does not know wh has received an informative or uninformative signal. Finally, we let of judge / at tier t that the defendant is liable (β = I). Note that w type is revealed either μ{ = 1 or μ' = 0.
The play of the game follows the obvious pattern. During trial the litigants) receive a public signal and the litigants receive a pr trial court then renders judgment. The losing litigant then decides w or not. If the losing litigant appeals, the appellate court, in the signal received at trial was uninformative, receives a second pu will be either fully revealing or completely uninformative. It will be helpful to summarize [2005] . There we showed that, in were possible. First, if the proba ciently high (specifically, π2 > 1 which only incorrectly losing lit the appellate court, in the absenc erwise it rules as dictated by the court or by itself.) Second, if th appeal is too low (π2 < 1 -c/d) a p rectly losing litigants appeal with those cases in which no informat probability.
In a three-tier hierarchy, we emphasized the existence of a fully separating, zeroerror equilibrium. Again, its existence depends on the probability of an informative public signal in the supreme court being sufficiently high (again, π3 > 1 -c/d). In this equilibrium the supreme court hears no cases. We then argued that the probability of an informative public signal should depend on the caseload of the court; as in this equilibrium, the caseload of the supreme court is minimal, the probability of an informative public signal is very high and the conditions for a fully separating equilibrium are satisfied.
In the separating equilibria in both the two and three-tiered models, the intermediate appellate and supreme courts exploit the information revealed by the fact that a litigant has appealed. That is, in the absence of an informative public signal that has revealed the defendant's type, the appellate court reverses the lower court judgment because it knows that only wrongly decided cases have, in equilib-5 In an alternative formulation, the judicial team would seek to maximize social welfare understood as a function of the error rate and the social costs of appeals. rium, been appealed. Similarly, when the trial court does not learn th type, it renders judgment according to its prior beliefs about the respo the defendant. When this probability p0 exceeds 1/2, the trial court dant liable, when p0 < 1/2, it finds for defendant. As we shall see feature of the equilibrium follows from the specification of judicial because judges prefer not to be overruled, they decide the cases ba beliefs about the defendant's type and those beliefs are influenced by t actions.
Interpretation
Both this model and the basic model of Cameron and Kornhauser [ models of error correction rather than law creation. An adjudication m least two ways: it might find erroneous facts or it might misapply the upon facts.
In the most direct interpretation of the current model, the trial yields public and private signals concerning the facts. Trials plausibly yield more accurate signals to private parties than to the courts because not all evidence discovered by the parties will be admissible in court. Each party is, moreover, likely to have private information that may be revealed during the course of trial preparation or trial.
In common law countries, of course, there is a reasonably strict division of labor between trial and appellate courts; trial courts find facts and appellate courts review the law. (Moreover, at trial, facts are often found by juries rather than courts.) A model of erroneous, judicial fact-finding subject to appellate review is thus inapposite. In civilian systems, however, intermediate appellate courts generally have the power to find facts de novo. Our model illustrates how this review of factfinding might work and suggests that a third tier of review of facts might improve results.
The division between fact-finding and law application, however, is not as clearcut in common law systems as this story suggests. Specifically, in many common law systems, "mixed" questions of law and fact arise; judgments of trial courts on these issues are subject to appellate review. In constitutional tort actions against federal officials, for example, the question of whether the official has acted as an official is a mixed question of law and fact. Similarly, in the review of governmental searches of persons and property, we might understand a variety of determinations as mixed questions of law and fact. Whether a particular location constitutes a "car" or a "home" which gives rise to some expectation of privacy is in part a legal determination.
The mixed character of these judgments suggests that our model captures at least part of the error correction functions of appellate review. The private parties are likely to have superior, and possibly asymmetric, knowledge of the factual aspect of the mixed judgment that the court must make. This knowledge may be revealed during trial or may become known to the uninformed party during trial or pre-trial discovery.
Equilibria in a Two-Tie
We search for perfect Bayesian ing, strategies must be sequential and beliefs must conform to Ba for two-tiered hierarchies in C in section 2.2 above. We focus on the appellate tier: one when nf we consider the equilibria that ar that is, we look for equilibria th structure.
High Quality of Appellate Adjudication: nf > (d -c)/d
When the appellate court is of sufficiently high quality, then the team of judges can eliminate error by exploiting the information of the defendant. Plaintiff: Plaintiff acts only off the equilibrium path. An informed plaintiff does not appeal when there is an informative signal, public or private, that defendant is not liable but appeals if there is an informative signal, public or private, that defendant is liable. An uninformed plaintiff may appeal with any probability.
Appellate judge: The appellate judge reverses any appeal that she hears.
The proof appears in the Appendix. Here we indicate the intuition for the proof.
This equilibrium exploits the knowledge of the defendant about the true state of the world. When the trial court receives an uninformative public signal about the defendant's type, the trial court places liability on the defendant. The defendant then must decide whether to appeal or not. Given the probability that the appellate court will learn defendant's type with sufficiently high probability, a correctly losing defendant has no incentive to appeal. Plaintiff has no incentive to appeal when he loses because he loses only in the event that defendant's type is publicly revealed.
Low Quality of Appellate Adjudication: nf < ( d -c)/d
When the appellate court cannot identify defendant's type with sufficient accuracy, there is no equilibrium in which no errors occur. When nf < (d -c)/d, we saw that, in an equilibrium in a two-tiered hierarchy, correctly losing litigants chose to appeal the trial judgment with some positive probability. In the prior model, the equilibrium behavior depended on the prior probability p0 that defendant was liable. When p0 > 1/2, the trial judge, when ignorant of the defendan the defendant liable. Conversely when p0 < 1/2, the trial judge, wh defendant's type, ruled against plaintiff. This behavior both minim reflects the trial judge's best guess concerning the correct outcome o it minimized the cost of appeals.
The best equilibrium for an error-minimizing team of judges m two factors. First we saw in section 3.1 that it might be best for t when ignorant of defendant's type, to hold defendant liable even t as holding defendant liable exploits defendant's superior knowledge compare the error rates of equilibria in which the trial judge, wh defendant's type, holds defendant liable to those in which she holds ag Second, the optimal equilibrium may depend on the quality of the pr the quality of the private signal declines, the desirability of holding liable in the absence of an informative public signal may increase, re value p0. In fact, we show in Proposition 2, that a decision rule at defendant liable when the public signal is uninformative is at least other decision rule.
Proposition 2 If π] < (d -c)/d, the following strategies constitute a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium:
Trial judge: If the public signal reveals defendant's type, the trial judge rules as dictated by the signal. Otherwise, she rules against defendant.
Plaintiff: If a public signal has revealed defendant's type and the trial court has ruled accordingly, plaintiff does not appeal. In the absence of an informative public signal, plaintiff has no move. Plaintiff's behavior in the event of off -the-equilibrium path actions by the trial court -i.e., the use of a different decisional rule that holds against her -are set out in the Appendix.
Defendant: If the trial court received an informative, public signal the defendant does not appeal. If the trial court did not receive an informative public signal, the defendant knows either that he was correctly held liable or that he was incorrectly held liable. When the trial judgment is incorrect, the defendant appeals with probability 1 (given the equilibrium probability that the appellate court will reverse). When the trial judgment is correct, the defendant appeals with probability (1 -po)/po (again given the equilibrium probability that the appellate judge will reverse).
Appellate judge: If the trial judge or the appellate judge received a signal that reveals the defendant's type, the appellate judge rules accordingly. If the appellate judge is ignorant of the defendant's type, she reverses the trial court judgment with
The proof appears in the Appendix. It is quite lengthy but reasonably straightforward in conception. First, we show that, on the equilibrium path, the above strategies are consistent. Second, we consider off-the-equilibrium path phenomena. The crucial step is to show that the trial court's decision rule is correct. To do this we characterize two sets of strategies for the litigants and the appellate court when faced by a trial We identify three classes of equilibria, each of which exists only under more restrictive conditions than those that must apply in the fully informed case. In the first class, the trial judge, in the absence of an informative public signal, rules against defendant. In the second class, the intermediate appellate court, in the absence of an informative public signal, rules against defendant. In the third class, which we might regard as the limit of the second class of equilibria, both inferior courts rule against defendant in the absence of an informative public signal. We state these equilibria in turn. Defendant on appeal: Correctly losing defendants do not appeal; incorrectly losing defendants do appeal.
Plaintiffs on appeal: Incorrectly losing plaintiffs appeal; but neither correctly losing nor uninformed plaintiffs appeal (all of which are off-the-equilibrium path events).
Supreme court: If it receives an informative signal it acts accordingly, otherwise it reverses.
The proof is in the Appendix. At this stage we note only that, in equilibrium, after an appeal, all plaintiffs are informed, as only incorrectly losing defendants appeal and the act of appeal signals their type to the court and to the litigants. We shall call equilibria of this class, trial-court-only equilibria as only the trial court, in the absence of an informative signal holds the defendant liable. Phrased trial court uses a defendant-liable default rule.
Second, this equilibrium replicates, for a restricted set of cases, the result for threetiered hierarchies established in CAMERON AND KORNHAUSER [2005] but the logic of the equilibrium is quite different. The trial-court-only equilibrium is sustainable only if the private signal is sufficiently likely to yield an informative signal. This condition implies that trial court procedures have to be of sufficiently high quality or the equilibrium will not exist.
Further, in the trial-court-only equilibrium, the trial court adopts a decision rule that, in some circumstances -when p0 < 1/2 -requires her to hold defendant liable even though she believes it more likely than not that defendant is not liable.
We now turn to the second class of equilibria in which only the intermediate appellate court adopts the default decision rule of ruling against defendant in the absence of an informative public signal. We have Trial judge: If there is an informative public signal the trial judge rules accordingly. In the absence of an informative public signal, the trial judge rules against the party it believes more likely to be liable (i.e., according to its priors).
Defendant at trial: Incorrectly losing defendants appeal; correctly losing defendants do not appeal.
Informed plaintiffs at trial: Incorrectly losing, informed plaintiffs appeal, correctly, losing informed plaintiff s do not appeal.
Uninformed plaintiffs at trial: Given p0 > c/d, these plaintiffs appeal with probability I.
Intermediate appellate court: If there is an informative signal, the court rules as indicated by the signal; otherwise it holds against defendant.
Defendant on appeal: Incorrectly losing defendants appeal; correctly losing defendants do not appeal.
Informed plaintiffs on appeal: Incorrectly losing plaintiffs appeal; correctly losing plaintiffs do not appeal.
Uninformed plaintiffs on appeal: Under the conditions of the theorem, they appeal (again, an off -the-equilibrium path event).
Supreme court: If there is an informative public signal the court rules accordingly.
Otherwise it reverses.
The proof is in the Appendix. We shall call equilibria of this class appellate-only equilibria. Note that the restriction on p0 insures that rational uninformed plaintiffs do not appeal.
In the appellate-only equilibrium, the supreme court hears some cases. It thus differs from the trial-court-only equilibrium and the three-tiered, full-information equilibrium of Cameron and Kornhauser [2005] . As with the trial-only equi- We call this equilibrium the full-default equilibrium. The proof appears in the Appendix. Its logic, however, is straightforward. As in the case of a two-tiered hierarchy, a final adjudicator of sufficiently high quality allows the judicial system to exploit the private information of the informed litigant. As in the case of the twotiered hierarchy, only the highest court uses a decision rule that draws inferences about the correct resolution of the dispute from the litigants' decisions to appeal. The trial court and the intermediate appellate court must decide against defendant even if they believe that is more probable than not that defendant is not liable; this exploits the information available to the fully informed defendant. The constraint on the quality of adjudication is unlikely to be binding. For c < 0.5d, the constraint is satisfied by any π2 > 0.
Discussion
Sections 3 and 4 have shown that litigant selection is still a powerful forc minimizing error even when the trial does not necessarily fully inform both liti about the appropriate resolution of the case. In this section we address three iss First, we discuss various criteria for selection among the three, zero-error equi that exist in the three-tiered hierarchy. Second, we show that the information s ture in this model may have an effect on the efficiency of adjudication. Third, speculate on the effect of further weakening the assumption on litigant informa
Choosing among Equilibria
We have identified three classes of zero-error equilibria in three-ti
We might choose among them in at least two ways. First, we mig number of appeals that arise in each equilibrium. The equilibrium number of appeals would impose the lowest social costs. Second, w the more "robust" equilibrium.
The following corollary to Propositions 3, 4, and 5 determines t appeals in each equilibrium. On this criterion, the appeals rate corollary shows that the trial-only equilibrium is best; in that equilibrium there are no appeals to the highest court and only cases wrongly decided by the trial court are appealed.
Second, we might consider the "robustness" of the equilibria. The trial-only equilibrium minimizes appeals but it only exists if the private signal is sufficiently informative. If the costs of appeal are small and the amount at issue is large then the private signal must be nearly always informative. Similarly, the appellate-only equilibrium imposes the condition that the (pre-trial) likelihood that plaintiff prevail be sufficiently high. In this case, if the costs of appeal are high relative to the amount at issue, then this condition is relatively stringent. Thus on these grounds, we might opt for the full-default equilibrium as the equilibrium that will hold in the most general circumstances.
The full-default equilibrium, moreover, is more robust than the other two equilibria in a second sense as well. It withstands more litigant deviations from equilibrium behavior than the other equilibria.
The Efficiency of the Courts
In Cameron and Kornhauser [2005] , we argued that the quality π' of adjudication at tier t depended on the amount of judicial resources devoted to a case. The amount of resources devoted to a case depended in turn on the number of cases before the court, the number of judges on the bench, and the size of the panels that heard cases. We summarized this dependence of quality on adjudicatory resources in the variable of caseload per judge.
In that model, we argued that th archy was sustainable because, in thus has adequate resources to in sufficient resources devoted to it
The situation in the model in th prior model placed no constrain they could be as bad as possible court level mattered. In this mod a three-tiered hierarchy places r by one or more of the inferior co Consider first the trial-only eq that the private signal received θ that defendant's type will be rules.
Similarly, when we pursue the previously and consider the depen at tier t on the caseload at tier t the quality of adjudication in th on the full-default equilibrium b equilibrium.
Recall from Corollary 1 that only cases wrongly decided at trial are appealed;
there are λ1 = (1 -π1 )(1 -p0) of these. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court
will receive an informative signal concerning π2 of these cases so that on appeal λ2 = (1 -π1) (I -7Γ2)(1 -po) will be wrongly decided. As long as the quality of review at the supreme court on each of these cases exceeds (d -c)/d, the supreme court case load will be only λ2 cases. To insure this quality, the administration of the court system may devote resources to trial courts, thereby increasing π 1 , or to the intermediate appellate courts, thereby increasing π2, or to the supreme court, thereby increasing π3. Note that adding a fourth tier appears unnecessary. If we assume that the expenditures at any given tier t yield diminishing marginal benefits in the improvement of π', then we would expect that the judicial team to devote some resources to insuring the quality of adjudication at each tier. This result contrasts sharply with the result in Cameron and Kornhauser [2005] ; there the quality of adjudication at trial and at the intermediate level was irrelevant to the quality of adjudication at the highest court of appeal.
Weaker Information Structures
Our model has shown the power of litigant selection in minimizing errors in adjudi-
cation. An appellate process may exploit private information available to litigants but not yet uncovered by courts to induce only losing litigants in wrongly decided cases to appeal. We have of course studied only a very special information technology.
We might extend our model in two directions. First, we might examine information structures in which a signal is only partially, rather than fully, informative. Here we conjecture that as long as the signals available to higher courts ar informative our results will continue to hold.
Second, in our model unrevealed information need not be common knowledge among the litigants. It may be known only to one party. Our model requires only that the information be potentially verifiable. In some, perhaps many, instances, however, one might expect that no party has all the information relevant to the appropriate determination of a dispute. Consider, for example, accidents governed by a rule of negligence with contributory negligence. In these cases, the injurer may have private information concerning the reasonableness of her own care decisions while the victim may have private information concerning the reasonableness of his care decisions. A trial might reveal this information to the court (and hence to both parties) or to one or to both litigants.
Our model might, when slightly extended, shed some light on situations of twosided, asymmetric information. To begin, we need to complicate the type space and hence the signaling space. As in the model outlined above, the defendant is either liable /, or not liable nl. Let plaintiff be either responsible r or not responsible nr.
Trial now yields three signals: a public signal β with probability πρ, a private signal ζ p with probability θρ to plaintiff concerning defendant's type, and a private signal ζ° with probability θ° to defendant concerning plaintiff's type. Notice that the public signal is now more complex: it is an ordered pair (ßp, ßD) and may take the four values (0, 0), (ßp, 0), (0, ßD) or (ßp, ßD). Thus the signal β may be completely uninformative, completely informative or partially informative.
This structure has several implications. To guide our intuitions, we rely on the fulldefault equilibrium. If the signal is partially informative or fully informative, then the model developed in this paper applies. The fully informative case is obvious; the trial judge knows the correct resolution of the case and it should decide according.
When the public signal at trial is partially informative, the trial judge ought to rule against the party whose type has not been revealed. The burden of appeal now lies on the litigant who is perfectly informed.6 Then, by the logic of Propositions 1 and 3, a sufficiently accurate final court will insure perfect sorting and an errorless court system. This result suggests that improving the quality of the trial process to increase the probability that the type of at least one litigant is revealed may be highly desirable.
When the public signal at trial is completely uninformative, the analysis is more complex and speculative. Consider a two-tiered hierarchy. Suppose that the public signal at the appellate level is sufficiently informative; i.e., π2 > (d -c)/d. Then it 6 A full analysis would consider the structure of the substantive legal rule before formulating the appropriate rule of decision. Suppose that the substantive rule has a structure parallel to the structure of a rule of negligence with contributory negligence. Under this rule, defendant is responsible if and only if (ßD = / and ßp = nr). Then if the trial court receives an informative signal about defendant, it should rule against plaintiff as only a plaintiff who is not responsible for her injury will appeal. Conversely, if the trial court receives an informative signal about plaintiff, it should hold defendant liable as only a non-responsible defendant will appeal. and μ2 (s2., jc2, x' p0) is determined by Bayes' rule whenever possible. If a public signal ever reveals β, the appellate judge believes the informative public signal regardless of an appeal.
Proof We proceed to show, by backwards induction, that each player's strategy is in equilibrium given the strategies of other players.
Appellate judge: There are four possibilities to consider: (1) an incorrectly losing litigant appeals from a judgment based on an uninformative signal at trial but the appellate judge receives an informative signal; (2) a (correctly losing defendant appeals from judgment based on an uninformati trial judge and the appellate judge also receives an uninformative incorrectly losing litigant appeals from a judgment based on an inf at trial; and (4) a correctly losing litigant appeals and either the tr appellate judge receives an informative signal. (Recall that an info to a court reveals defendant's type with complete accuracy and be knowledge to the judiciary.)
In case (1), the informative public signal on appeal fixes the ap beliefs at 0 or 1 ; obviously the appellate judge minimizes error by ho liable if β = I and by ruling against plaintiff if β = ni In case (2), strategy and Bayes' rule fix the appellate judge's beliefs at 0. Given t judgment again follows immediately. (Note that, given the strategy of there will be no losing plaintiffs when the trial judge receives an signal.) Case (3) is an out-of-equilibrium event so Bayes' rule has the beliefs indicated in the proposition fix the appellant judge's be to the informative public signal, and again the indicated judgmen consider case (4), which occurs only off the equilibrium path, as the is improperly appealed. Again, Bayes' rule has no bite, but the sp require the appellate judge to believe the informative signal. The a thus upholds the judgment of the trial court. losing litigant will definitely appeal, since doing so will result in informative public signal on appeal (jc2 = β) leading to reversal, or signal of innocence in the absence of a hard signal (jc2 = 0), from Bay leading to reversal. (B) Given xl = 0, a correctly losing litigant wil the expected value from appeal is less than the sure value from no the trial judge, in the absence of an informative signal, rules against need only calculate the condition that insures that a correctly losing not appeal:
. This is t indicated in the proposition.
(2) Suppose an informative signal at trial (jc1 = β). Again we conside responses of a correctly losing and incorrectly losing litigant in turn.
losing litigant will not appeal, given the specified off-the-equilibri (the appellate judge believes the informative public signal and thu same way as the trial judge, gaining the correctly losing litigant noth him an additional c). (B) An incorrectly losing litigant will definit the appellate judge's (off-the-equilibrium path) belief is that the info signal was correct, and so he reverses.
Now consider an uninformed losing litigant, which given the str trial court and the information structure is an off-the-equilibrium pa strategy, the trial judge knows informed litigant -here the defe formed. The off-the-equilibrium a trial ruling for plaintiff implies the trial judge has an incentive to adhere to its strategy. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof involves 5 lemmata and a corollary. Lemma 1 establishes sequentially rational play, if the trial judge has held the defendant liable. Lemmata 2 and 3 establish sequentially rational play, if the trial judge has held the defendant not liable (there are two such lemmata, corresponding to values of θ above or below a critical value). Lemma 4 compares expected error rates in the three scenarios corresponding to Lemmata 1-3. The corollary to Lemma 4 indicates the optional decision rule for the trial judge, in light of Lemma 4. Lemma 5 addresses pooling equilibria. Proposition 2 ties all these results together. We assume throughout that the condition π2 < 1 -d/c that defines Proposition 2 holds.
Lemma 1 (defendant held liable) In this case, the following constitute se- Beliefs are determined by Bayes ' rule whenever possible. If a public signal ever reveals β, the appellate judge believes the informative public signal regardless of an appeal.
Proof The strategies follow straightforwardly from examination of incentive compatibility constraints. The analysis is virtually identical to that given in Cameron AND Kornhauser [2005, Proposition 2b] and is omitted for brevity. Q.E.D. Beliefs are determined by Bayes * rule whenever possible. If a hard signal ever reveals β, the appellate judge believes the hard signal regardless of an appeal.
Proof The strategies follow straightforwardly from examination of incentive compatibility constraints. In all cases, if there has been an informative public signal, an appeal by plaintiff is not profitable as the appellate judge will believe the signal and sustain the trial judge's judgment. So consider the cases without an informative public signal.
(1) Suppose there has been an informative private signal at trial, and the plaintiff knows she has lost incorrectly. If plaintiff is to appeal it must be the case that nfd + (1 -7T2)p2d -c ^ 0, which will hold if and only if (2) Suppose there has been an informative private signal at trial, and the plaintiff knows she has lost correctly. If the plaintiff is not to appeal, it must be the case that (the plaintiff's probability of appeal absent a hard or soft signal at trial).
percentage is 1 less this quantity, which, after some algebra, is [po/l -2po](l -ttOU -2p0 -(1 -ρο)θπ2). Proof As usual we proceed by backwards induction. The highest court judge: Following an appeal by a defendan will believe that the defendant was incorrectly held liable, and happen in equilibrium). An appeal by plaintiff is off the equ that the supreme court believes such an appeal indicates defe a contrary hard signal), and holds for plaintiff. Defendant after an adverse trial judgment: Defendant types separate so that only incorrectly losing defendants will appeal. Given the strategy of the intermediate appellate court, a defendant will be held liable by the appellate court under the default rule if that court receives an uninformative public signal. But if this is incorrect, the defendant will appeal (as the supreme court will reverse). So, for defendant to appeal after an incorrect adverse trial judgment, it must be the case that
. This is the se in the proposition.
Informed plaintiff afie r an adverse trial judgment: Informed plaintif plaintiff has lost correctly, he has no incentive to appeal even though th court will reverse the trial court, because the defendant will surel supreme court will reverse the intermediate court. If plaintiff has l he will definitely appeal because the intermediate court will revers will not appeal.
Uninformed plaintiff after an adverse trial judgment: The plaint if she appeals, the case will ultimately be adjudicated correctly. appeal only if she is reasonably sure defendant is liable, that is pod + (1 -po)O -c > 0, that is, if and only if p0 > c/d. This con remaining one in the theorem. Otherwise, he will not appeal (an errors).
Trial court: If there is an informative public signal at trial, the court follows it.
Otherwise, it rules according to its priors. Q.E.D. Proof The proof proceeds via backward induction.
High court (tier 3) judge: Appeals to the high court are out-of-equilibrium events so Bayes' rule has no bite. However, we require the high court's judge's beliefs to be fixed in the natural way if any χ* φ 0, (t -1, 2, 3). In that case, the indicated judgments follow from the judicial objective of minimizing error. Absent an informative public signal, the most favorable belief to appeals (and difficult for the equilibrium) has received an informative signal that β = ni. In these circumstances, the supreme court will uphold the judgment so that plaintiff will not appeal.
Intermediate appellate (tier 2) judge: There are three cases. Case (1): χ1 = β. An appeal following an informative public signal at trial is an out-of-equilibrium action so Bayes' rule has no bite. We specify that the appellate judge believes the informative public signal (so that μ2 = 0 or 1, as x2 -I or /, respectively), and the indicated judgments follow immediately from Proposition 1.
Case (2): jc1 = 0, χ2 = β. In this case, μ2 = 0 or 1, as x2 = I or /, respectively, and the indicated judgment follows from the judicial objective of minimizing errors.
Case ( Litigant losing at trial: There are two cases. Case (1): Incorrectly losing litigant. Given the trial judge's rule of decision, in equilibrium, only defendants may be incorrectly losing litigants. With probability π2 the intermediate appellate court receives an informative public signal and hence reverses. The losing litigant on appeal (the plaintiff) will not appeal as the informative signal implies that the supreme court will uphold the judgment. With probability (1 -π2) the court receives an uninformative signal and hence upholds the judgment. This judgment will be reversed on appeal to the higher court at an additional cost of c. Thus an incorrectly losing defendant appeals if and only π2 > 2 -d/c. Following the reversal, at tier 2 the correctly losing litigant does not appeal so that the correct judgment stands.
Case (2): Correctly losing litigant. If there is a hard signal at trial, an appeal gains nothing and costs c, so is not undertaken. Suppose the public signal at trial is uninformative. If an informative public signal emerges at appeal, the appellant loses again and further appeal is hopeless. If an informative signal does not emerge on appeal at tier 2, the appellant-defendant definitely loses at tier 2. An appeal to the
